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A. General Questions  
1. What was the influence on your national legal order, if any, of the recent developments in the case 
law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on standing of individuals and/or NGOs 
(notably cases C-237/07 Janecek; C-263/08 Djurgarden; C 115/09 Trianel; C 240/09 Slovak Brown 
Bear; C 416/10, Krizan). Have environmental laws been amended? Please illustrate. 
For the moment Environmental or Procedural Laws have not been amended under the 
influence of the case law of the CJEU, although different proposals to amend Procedural 
Law (both for the ordinary Judiciary and for the Council of State) have been introduced in 
the past by some members of the parliament in view of insuring better implementation of 
the Aarhus Convention
1
 (see: Aarhus Compliance Committee, Findings and 
Recommendations with regard to compliance by Belgium with its obligations under the 
Aarhus Convention in the case of access to justice for Environmental organizations to 
challenge decisions in court (Communication ACCC/C/2005/11 by Bond Beter Leefmilieu 
Vlaanderen VZW (Belgium))2. These proposals are still pending in Parliament. Another 
proposal to amend the Act of 12 January 1993 to strengthen the existing action for 
injunctive relief in environmental matters and facilitate access to it for NGOs was 
introduced in the Senate on 1 April 2007
3
. It was re-introduced after the 2007 general 
elections
4
, but not discussed and  not reintroduced in the current legislature. 
 
2. Have there been any changes in the jurisprudence of the national courts concerning standing of 
individuals and/or standing of NGOs as a result of CJEU’s recent judgements? Have the courts in your 
country relied on the principle of effective judicial protection or used arguments about CJEU case law 
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 Proposition de loi modifiant les lois coordonnées sur le Conseil d’Etat en vue d’accorder aux associations le 
droit d’introduire une action d’intérêt collectif, déposée par Mme Muriel Gerkens et consorts, 19 July 2011, 
Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, DOC 53 1693/001 ; a similar proposal has been introduced in the 
Senate : Proposition de loi modifiant les lois coordonnées sur le Conseil d’Etat en vue d’accorder aux 
associations le droit d’introduire une action d’intérêt collectif, déposée par Mmes Z. Khattabi and Freya Piryns, 
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in order to widen up standing for individuals and/or NGOs in environmental procedures since the 
signing/ratification of the Aarhus Convention? If so, please illustrate.  
2.1. Although Belgian jurisprudence is quite often referring to the Aarhus Convention 
(e.g. the Constitutional Court in 22 judgements, the Council of State in 123 judgements) 
there is far less reference to the Aarhus related case law of the CJEU.  
 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
2.2. The Constitutional Court referred to different judgments of the CJEU, including C-
263/08 Djurgarden and C-427/08, Irish Costs, in the judgement by which it referred a series 
of questions for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU
5.  This case is about the Decree of the 
Walloon Parliament of 17 July 2008 on certain permits for which there are overriding 
reasons in the public interest (Décret du Parlement wallon du 17 juillet 2008 relatif à 
quelques permis pour lesquels il existe des motifs impérieux d’intérêt général). Articles 1 to 
4 of that Decree (Legislative Act of the Walloon Parliament) provided that overriding 
reasons in the public interest have been established for the grant of town-planning 
permits, environmental permits and combined permits relating to acts and works for the 
improvement of the infrastructure and public buildings of the regional airports of Liège-
Bierset and Brussels South Charleroi, the RER rail network, the structural modes of public 
transport for Charleroi, Liège, Namur and Mons and the missing road and waterway links 
of the trans-European transport network in the Walloon Region. These permits could be 
granted by the Walloon Government. Within 45 days of their being granted the 
Government had to submit these permits to the Walloon Parliament. The Walloon 
Parliament had to ratify the permits submitted to it within 60 days. Furthermore the 
articles 5 to 9 of the Decree provided that a series of permits, for which overriding reasons 
in the public interest have been established, were ratified. These permits are relative to 
some works and activities concerning Liège-Bierset Airport, Charleroi-Brussels South 
Airport, the RER network and the associated structures, a wastewater treatment plan and 
a management and training centre.  
The Conseil d’État (Council of State or Supreme Administrative Court) essentially has 
jurisdiction to rule on actions for annulment brought against administrative acts such as 
environmental and building permits. It does  however not have jurisdiction to hear actions 
brought against acts of a legislative character. The ratification by decree of the Walloon 
Parliament of those permits gave those acts legislative status. The Conseil d’État 
consequently ceased to have jurisdiction to hear actions for annulment brought against 
the acts thus ratified, which could now be challenged only before the Constitutional Court, 
before which, however, only certain grounds may be pleaded, namely violation of the 
Constitution, in conjunction with provisions of international and European law. The 
Constitutional Court is in principle not competent to verify the procedural legality 
(including observance of EIA legislation, public participation…)  of the permits that have 
been ratified by the Parliament. Thus the judicial review of those permits is much more 
restricted than normal administrative permits. 
                                                          
5
 Constitutional Court, n° 30/2010, 30 March 2010, M.-N. Solvay and Others. This is  CJEU Case C-182/10, Solvay 
and Others that is very similar to CJEU, Joined cases C-128/09 to C-131/09, C-134/09 and C-135/09, Boxus and 
Others and  Joined Cases C-177/09 to C-179/09, Le Poumon vert de la Hulpe and Others. 
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The Constitutional Court had before it a number of actions seeking annulment of the 
decree of the Walloon Parliament of 17 July 2008 which ‘ratified’ the building permits for 
various works that is to say, authorized them in view of ‘overriding reasons in the public 
interest’. The Court further had before it questions referred by the Conseil d’État for a 
ruling on the lawfulness of that decree. The Conseil d’État had previously already itself 
raised the question of the compatibility of the decree with European Union law and the 
Aarhus Convention and referred questions on that point to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling.  The Constitutional Court on is turn referred different questions for a preliminary 
ruling to the CJEU. The essential question was if the Aarhus Convention and the 
implementing EU directives were applicable to such a decree or not, and if so, if the 
constitutional review of the Constitutional Court satisfied the requirements of art. 9 (3) 
and (4) of the Aarhus Convention.  
The CJEU held in this respect
6
,:  “2. Article 2(2) of the Convention on access to information, 
public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters and 
Article 1(5) of Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the 
effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, as amended by Directive 
2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003, must be 
interpreted as meaning that only projects the details of which have been adopted by a 
specific legislative act, in such a way that the objectives of the Convention and the 
directive have been achieved by the legislative process, are excluded from the scope of 
those instruments. It is for the national court to verify that those two conditions have been 
satisfied, taking account both of the content of the legislative act adopted and of the 
entire legislative process which led to its adoption, in particular the preparatory 
documents and parliamentary debates. In that regard, a legislative act which does no 
more than simply ‘ratify’ a pre-existing administrative act, by merely referring to 
overriding reasons in the public interest without a substantive legislative process enabling 
those conditions to be fulfilled having first been commenced, cannot be regarded as a 
specific act of legislation within the meaning of the latter provision and is therefore not 
sufficient to exclude a project from the scope of that Convention and that directive as 
amended.” 
Based on the answer of the CJEU in particular the  paragraphs 30 to 48 of the judgment in 
Solvay and Others case, the Constitutional Court7 has  meanwhile come to the conclusion, 
looking also to the parliamentary discussions, that the Decree does not satisfy the 
conditions set out by the CJEU to be considered as a “specific legislative act” that can be 
exempted from full judicial review. The Court annuls therefore the articles 1 to 6 and 15 to 
17 of the Decree for violation of the articles 10, 11 and 23 of the Constitution, in 
combination with the aforementioned provisions of the Aarhus Convention and Directive 
85/337/EEC. It declares that the other articles (that were not challenged by a demand for 
annulment) are violating the same provisions, so that they must be set aside by the 
courts
8
.  The result of the case is that all of the permits concerned can now be subject of 
full judicial review by the Council of State and that the Council can judge the pending 
cases. 
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 CJEU, C-182/10 , Solvay and Others, 16 February 2012 
7
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2.3. The Constitutional Court annulled the reduction, in the Flemish Region,  of the time 
limit to lodge a judicial appeal with the (new) Council of Permit Contestations to 30 days 
from the day after the contested decision is made public (instead of 60 days to lodge an 
appeal with the Council of State from the day one becomes aware of the decision) 
accepting an argument based on the violation of art. 10, 11 and 23 of the Constitution, 
combined with art. 6 ECHR and art 9 of the Aarhus Convention
9
.  This time limit has 
meanwhile be prolonged to 45 days.  
2.4.  The Constitutional Court,  that has itself a broad view on standing of NGO’s
10
 and 
private persons,  invited the Council of State, with references to the case ECtHR, 24 
February 2009, L’Erablière ASBL  v. Belgium and other ECtHR cases, not to apply to 
restrictive or formalistic requirements when assessing the interest requirement
11
.  In a 
recent judgment the Constitutional Court invited the Council of State again to restrain 
from a to formalistic application of rules regarding admissibility
12
. 
SUPREME COURT 
2.5. The Supreme Court (Court of Cassation) has for the moment not referred to any of 
the Aarhus cases of the CJEU. Nevertheless the Aarhus Convention has influenced recently 
the case law of the Supreme Court in a dramatic way.  
In the 1970s, a trend could be discerned in Belgium whereby the civil courts and the 
criminal courts (as far as actions for damages are concerned) increasingly acknowledged 
that environmental groups could rely on a collective interest to have standing.  This trend 
was stemmed by the Supreme Court in the so-called Eikendael judgment of 19 November 
1982 (Hof van Cassatie, Nv S. v. Vzw Werkgroep voor Milieubeheer Brasschaat, 19 
November 1982).  In this judgment the Supreme Court considered that, in accordance with 
Article 17 of the Judicial Code, no legal action is admissible if the plaintiff has no interest in 
bringing such an action. According to the Court, unless the law provides otherwise, legal 
proceedings instituted by a natural or legal person were not admissible if the plaintiff had 
no personal and direct interest, in other words, no interest of its own. The court left no 
doubt that public interest does not amount to 'own interest'. The own interest of a legal 
person is only that which affects its existence or its tangible and intangible assets, its 
property, honour and reputation. A corporate purpose, even if this be the protection of 
the environment, was in the Court's view not an own interest.   
The Supreme Court had till recently not the opportunity to reconsider this case law in the 
light of the Aarhus Convention.  The first occasion to do so, a  Judgment of 11 June 2013
13
, 
brought a radical change in the Court’s approach towards standing of environmental 
NGO’s.  The Court held that Art. 3 (4) of the Aarhus Convention stipulates that Each Party 
“shall provide for appropriate recognition of and support to associations, organizations or 
groups promoting environmental protection and ensure that its national legal system is 
consistent with this obligation”. Art. 9 (3) of the Convention stipulate that:  “In addition 
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 Constitutional Court, n° 8/2011, 27 January 2011, A. De Bats and Others v. Flemish Government. 
10
 See e.g. Constitutional Court, n° 114/2009, 9 July 2009, L’Erablière asbl 
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and without prejudice to the review procedures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, 
each Party shall ensure that, where they meet the criteria, if any, laid down in its national 
law, members of the public have access to administrative or judicial procedures to 
challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public authorities which contravene 
provisions of its national law relating to the environment.” Art. 2(4) define “the public” as 
“one or more natural or legal persons, and, in accordance with national legislation or 
practice, their associations, organizations or groups”. Therefore, says the Court, it follows 
from these provisions that Belgium has engaged itself to secure access to justice for 
environmental NGOs when they like to challenge acts or omissions of private persons and 
public authorities which contravene domestic environmental law, provided they meet the 
criteria laid down in national law. Those criteria may not be construed or interpreted in 
such a way that they deny such organizations in such a case access to justice. Judges 
should interpret the criteria laid down in national law in conformity with the objectives of 
art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention. According Art. 3 of the Preliminary Title of the Criminal 
Procedure Code, the legal action to repair damages belong to the victims. They shall 
demonstrate a direct and personal interest. When such an action is introduced by an 
environmental NGO and aims to challenge acts and omissions that contravene domestic 
environmental law, such an environmental NGO has a sufficient interest to do so. The 
Supreme Court approves the challenged judgment of the Court of Appeal of Brussels that 
accepted the action in reparation of an environmental NGO in a criminal case dealing with 
violations of the Flemish Code on Town and Country Planning (illegal construction of horse 
stables and an outdoor arena). 
 
SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COURT 
Explicit references to CJEU case law 
2.6. With reference to case C-240/09 Slovak Brown Bear the Council of State came to 
the conclusion that Art. 8 of the Aarhus Convention has no direct effect
14
. 
2.7. With reference to the same case, especially paragraphs 47 en 48 ( “it is for the 
domestic legal system of each Member State to lay down the detailed procedural rules 
governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law, in this case 
the Habitats Directive, since the Member States are responsible for ensuring that those 
rights are effectively protected in each case” and “it is apparent from well-established 
case-law, the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s 
rights under EU law must be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic 
actions (principle of equivalence) and must not make it in practice impossible or 
excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness)”), 
the Council of State held that Art. 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention is not establishing an 
unconditional right to an effective appeal that would preclude any condition of 
admissibility. The Council is of the opinion that  the necessity to demonstrate a lawful 
personal interest is not violating the Convention. Even if such a condition must be 
interpreted broadly for environmental NGO’s, there is still a need to demonstrate a 
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 Conseil d’Etat, n° 220.463, 14 Augustus 2012, asbl Ligue Royale belge pour la protection des oiseaux 
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sufficient direct link between the challenged act and the objective of the association that 
would be prejudiced, otherwise one would be confronted with an actio popularis15. 
2.8. With reference to the Opinion of Advocate general Sharpston in case C-263/08 
Djurgarden the Council of State was of the Opinion that the necessity to give large access 
to justice to environmental NGO’s does not mean that such an NGO, to be admissible, 
must not respect the prescriptions of national law governing the management of non-
profit organisations (in this case the obligation to publish modifications in the composition 
of the board in the official journal)
16
. Later on the Council of State referred in that case a 
question for a preliminary ruling to the Constitutional Court
17
 and the Constitutional Court 
found the interpretation of the Council of State of the relevant provision of the Act 
governing non-profit organisations (that the action is automatically inadmissible if the 
changes in the composition of the board were not published) violates the Constitution, 
while another interpretation (that the organisation has still the possibility to proof that 
the change in the composition has been taken effectively place and the defending party is 
aware of it) would not violate the Constitution
18
. 
2.9. The Council of State has suspended a building permit of a railroad project that is 
located on the territory of two regions (with different legal regimes) considered to be 
illegal because of violation of the legislation on the use of languages.  The applicant 
referred  to case C-416/10 Krizan while asking for interim relief.  The Council of State is of 
the opinion that the applicant will undergo a difficult to rectify prejudice and suspend the 
building permit, rejecting a request of the defending railway company to reject this 
demand on the basis of a balance of conflicting interests
19
.  
Case law of the ECtHR 
2.10. In the case of L’Erablière ASBL20 a local environmental NGO demanded the 
annulment of a decision granting planning permission for a waste treatment plant in a 
nature protection area. In a decision of 26 April 2007 the Council of State declared the 
applicant association's application for judicial review inadmissible because the statement 
of facts did not satisfy the official requirements and did not provide the Council of State 
and the judge examining the case with sufficient information. Relying on Article 6 (1) ECHR 
(right to a fair hearing), the applicant association complained that the inadmissibility 
decision regarding its application for judicial review of planning permission amounted to a 
violation of its right of access to a court.  The ECtHR considered that increasing the 
capacity of a waste collection site could directly affect the private life of the members of 
L'Erablière, and stressed that the aim of the association was limited to the protection of 
the local environment. Consequently, it found that its action could not be regarded as an 
actio popularis and held that Article 6 was therefore applicable. The ECtHR noted that the 
submission of a statement of the facts was one of the formal requirements under domestic 
law for lodging an application for judicial review before the Council of State. It observed, 
however, that the Council of State and the opposing party could have acquainted 
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themselves with the facts even without this statement. The Court concluded that the 
limitation on the right of access to a court imposed on the applicant association was 
disproportionate to the requirements of legal certainty and the proper administration of 
justice, contrary to Article 6 (1) ECHR. 
Environmental NGOs 
2.11. As the case law of the Council of State
21
 is concerned, we can repeat  what has been 
written in  the Study on factual aspects of access to justice in relation to  EU Environmental 
law. Belgium (2012) commissioned by the European Commission. For the moment it seems 
that the jurisprudence of the Council of State is subject to evolution. In a recent judgment 
of the general assembly of the Council of State
22
, the Council used the usual formula of the 
Constitutional Court concerning standing requirements for NGO’s, in stating that a non-
profit organization that has legal personality (association sans but lucrative) has standing if 
its statutory objective is of a particular nature, and thus different from that of general 
interest, that she is defending a collective interest, that de statutory aim can be affected 
by the challenged act and that it is obvious that she is pursuing her statutory objective in 
an active way (para 28.2.3.2). A similar formula was used in later judgments
23
. Since the 
creation of particular administrative courts dealing with immigration law (on the federal 
level) and building permits and alike in the Flemish region, the caseload is indeed 
becoming more manageable and the backlog is gradually disappearing. Together with 
pressures from the ECtHR
24
, the Constitutional Court
25
 and the Aarhus Compliance 
Committee
26
, it can be expected that the Council will become more lenient again. For the 
moment there is however no clear picture.  Triggered by the Aarhus Convention, some 
judgments can be welcomed
27
, while in others the Council of State is of the opinion that its 
previous stricter approach is consistent with art. 9 of the Aarhus Convention
28
. In the latter 
case law the Council of State is of the opinion that although environmental NGO’s are 
presumed to have an interest by virtue of Art. 9 (2) of the Aarhus Convention, they must 
also show “capacity” or “quality” (“hoedanigheid” “capacité”), a somewhat unclear 
concept in this context that is interpreted in that sense that there should be a clear match 
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 See for a complete overview of the case-law since the creation of the Council of State in 1948 till mid 2010, 
discussing around 900 judgments relating to more than 600 cases: P. Lefranc, Over de ontvangst van 
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Raad van State, n° 193.593, 28 May 2009,  vzw  Milieufront Omer Wattez;  Raad van State, n° 197.598, 3 
November 2009,  vzw Stichting Omer Wattez; Raad van State, n° 213.916, 16 June 2011, vzw Natuurpunt 
Beheer. 
28
 E.g. Raad State, n°  197.509, 3 November 2009, vzw Milieufront Omer Wattez and more than 20 other 
judgments in the same sense; P. Lefranc (2010), 446 
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(proportionality) between the statutory objective of the NGO and the contested project
29
. 
A regional organisation can in that view only challenge projects of regional interest, not 
smaller projects that are only of local relevance, or bigger projects that are of supra 
regional interest.  Sometimes also “representativity” (“representativité“ 
“representativiteit”) is requested, meaning that the association should have sufficient 
support  of the people living in the area that is affected by the contested decision.
30
  
 
3. What are, to your opinion, the main challenges for judges in your national legal system 
when it comes to access to justice in the field of environment and the development of the 
CJEU´s case law? 
3.1. We can repeat on this point also what has been written in the Study on factual aspects 
of access to justice in relation to EU Environmental law. Belgium (2012): delay in 
adjudication and applying effective remedies seems to be the main challenges.  
 
3.2. According to the Organic Act on the Council of State (Art 17 (4)) the president or acting 
president of the competent Chamber of the Council of State should decide on the demand 
for suspension within a period of 45 days. If an administrative decision or regulation is 
suspended, a final decision on the demand for annulment should be delivered within the 
following six months. There is however no sanction for transgressing this time limits. In 
practice, these time limits were seldom observed in the past.  It seems that decisions on 
demands of suspension are delivered in practice 4 to 9 months after the introduction of 
the case.  When the act or regulation is not suspended, deciding on the merits of the cases 
can take a long time, till recently delays of five to ten years were not exceptional.  Some of 
the cases were found at the end to have no subject anymore, because e.g. the period of 
validity of a challenged permit had expired meanwhile
31
. Because the backlog of the 
Council of State is gradually disappearing in recent times, nowadays decisions on demands 
for suspension seems to be taken within a period of 5 months on average and on demands 
for annulment within a period of 2 to 2,5 years. This should be in the near future 12 to 18 
months. There are no clear figures on the performance of the Flemish Council for Permit 
Disputes
32
.  It is however clear that this Council has already build up a serious backlog, so 
that the Council is not meeting the requirement of timely judgments for the moment
33
. 
The Judicial Code provides in its Articles 1035 to 1041 a fast track procedure (“summary 
proceedings”) for dealing with requests for interim relief. The cases can be handled on very 
short notice. That same procedure – but leading to a judgment on the merits of the case - 
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 P. Lefranc (2010) 447-453; P. Lefranc (2012), 642-644;  the Council is sometimes of the opinion that there is a 
sufficient proportional relationship between the material and territorial sphere of action of a (sub-)regional 
environmental NGO and a contested decision (e.g.: Raad van State, n° 208.918, 10 November 2010, vzw Natuur 
en Landschap Meetjesland  concerning a specific land use plan for an industrial facility), while on other 
occasions it believes that this is not the case (e.g. Raad van State, n° 208.116, 13 October 2010, vzw Milieufront 
Omer Wattez (building permit for an individual house); Raad van State, n° 208.473, 27 October 2010, vzw 
Milieufront Omer Wattez (building permit for an individual house)).  
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 P. Lefranc (2010) 453-454. 
31
 P. Lefranc, De vereiste van het actueel belang. En de redelijke termijn ?, Tijdschrift voor Milieurecht, 2005, 
667-671. 
32
 See for a random sampling of processing times: Raad voor Vergunningsbetwistingen, Jaarverslag 2010-2011, 
Brussels, 55-59.  
33
 Raad voor Vergunningsbetwistingen, Jaarverslag 2010-2011, 59-65. 
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is applicable in the framework of the Act of 12 January 1993 on a Right of Action for the 
Protection of the Environment (Art. 3(1)). We can quote an example of a case introduced 
on June 7
th
 2004, with a decision in first instance on June 24
th
 2004 and a decision on 
appeal on July 2th 2004.
34
 However, such a diligent  handling of cases seems to be  
exceptional.  Especially when there is appeal it can happen that the case takes different 
years to be settled
35
. 
 
 
3.3. In general one can say that the different courts dispose of sufficient remedies to 
provide for adequate and effective relief. However, in practice, there are a lot of cases that 
deliver unsatisfactory results, mainly because of the delays in handling the cases due to 
the historical backlog with the Council of State (and the newly build up backlog with the 
Flemish Council for Permit Disputes) and on the level of the Courts of Appeal, as civil (and 
penal) cases are concerned.  When a plan or permit is challenged before the Council of 
State or the Flemish Council for Permit Disputes  and one does not obtain the suspension 
of the challenged act within a short period, the risk is real that the developments or 
projects have been completely or largely realised
36
 on the ground the day the act is 
annulled some years later.  It can also happen that a project has to be stopped in the 
course of its realisation if it takes too much time to obtain a suspension of the permit.  
That is frustrating, not only for the third parties, but also for the developers and the 
authorities. That is especially so if the Council decides e.g. to annul with very much delay 
on (very) formal grounds, without going into the substantive issues.  It can lead to delays 
in development, extra costs,  repeated  attempts to regularize the situation,  followed by 
renewed disputes and judgments, claims for damages and, finally, loss of respect for and 
credibility of the court system.  This situation partially explains also why regional 
authorities have tried to circumvent judicial review by the Council of State in providing 
ratification of  some permits for larger projects by the regional parliament, which has as a 
result that those acts could only be challenged before the Constitutional Court, with a less 
extended review as a consequence. Such an approach is only under strict conditions 
compatible with EU law (see para 2.2). 
 
  
                                                          
34
 P. Lefranc, De milieustakingswet: overzicht van rechtspraak (1993-2008), Tijdschrift voor Milieurecht 2009,  
25. 
35
 Lefranc (2009), 25.  Very exceptional is however a decision on the admissibility of a case only, that was taken   
more than 4 years after the introduction of it (and that has been appealed before a judgment on the merits 
was passed): President of the Court of First Instance, Ghent 26 September 2011, Tijdschrift voor Milieurecht 
2011, 711-718. 
36
 E.g. Council of State, n° 212.825, 28 April 2011, Lauwers. The Council of State annuls a building permit – 
delivered on 29 March 2007 - for the construction of a tramway Deurne-Wijnegem, together with the decision 
to release the operator from the obligation to prepare an EIA, because that second decision was found to be 
unlawful (the decision that there were no significant impacts to be expected was found inconsistent with the 
elements of a mobility study on cut-through traffic). In that respect the case-law of the Council of State seems 
in line with the case law  of the ECJ (Case C-75/08 Mellor [2009] ECR-I-3799, paras 57-59). The demand for 
suspension had been rejected in 2008 (Council of State, n° 183.799, 4 June 2008).  The construction was nearly 
completed the day the judgment on the merits was passed. The construction works have been delayed. 
Meanwhile the permit has been issued again with relative minor changes, but that seems to satisfy the 
requester and the tramway became operational in April 2012. 
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4. Taking into account that access to justice in environmental matters is required to not be 
prohibitively expensive (cf. Art 25.4. IED; Art 11.4. EIA Directive, both reflecting Art 9.4. 
Aarhus Convention): How do you, all in all, evaluate the system of access to justice in your 
country when it comes to costs and liability for costs (e.g., court fees, lawyer´s fees, cost for 
administrative procedure, expert fees)? Do costs have a chilling effect in environmental 
litigation?  
We can repeat on this point also what has been written in  the Study on factual aspects of 
access to justice in relation to  EU Environmental law. Belgium” (2012) and in the Synthesis 
report of the study on the Implementation of Articles 9.3 and 9.4 of the Aarhus Convention 
in Seventeen of the Member States of the European Union (2012): although fees and costs 
are not a real obstacle, they have a chilling effect.  
 
Civil cases 
In civil matters the principle is that the losing party has to pay the costs, except when 
there is an agreement in another sense between the parties that is ratified by the Court 
(art. 1017 Judicial Code). Are considered as costs (art. 1018): 
- court fees; 
- costs of judicial acts; 
- costs for expedition of judgements; 
- costs of experts and witnesses; 
- travel expenses of the judges, the registrar and the parties made for the particular 
case, when the travel is ordered by the court; 
- the judicial allowance; 
- the honorarium and costs of the mediator appointed by the court. 
The judgement will fix these costs, after the parties have had the opportunity to declare 
and prove them (art. 1021).  Some of the costs are fixed by law or executive order.  
The court fees vary according to the instance. The fee is 82 EUR before a court of first 
instance, 186 EUR before a court of appeal and 325 EUR before the Supreme Court. There 
are fixed tariffs for issuing a summons by a bailiff to introduce a new case (around 50 EUR) 
and for witnesses (5 EUR per appearance in court). Court fees as such do no vary according 
to “the value of the case”. 
The basic, minimum, and maximum amounts of the procedural allowance (contribution to 
the honorarium and costs of the lawyer of the winning party) are determined by the Royal 
Decree of 26 October 2007 (Moniteur belge, 9 November 2007). These allowances apply 
per instance (first instance, appeal, cassation…). When the claim is or can be expressed in 
money the allowance will vary according the value of the claim. E.g. for a claim of less than 
250 EUR, the basic allowance is 150 EUR, with a minimum of 75 EUR and a maximum of 
300 EUR. For a claim between 10.000 and 20.000 EUR, the basic allowance will be of 1.100 
EUR, with a minimum of 625 EUR and a maximum of 2.500 EUR. For a claim of more than 
1.000.000 EUR the basic allowance is 15.000 EUR, with a minimum of 1.000 EUR and a 
maximum of 30.000 EUR.  For claims that cannot be expressed in money the basic amount 
is 1.200 EUR, with a minimum of 75 EUR and a maximum of 10.000 EUR. There is also a fee 
on delivering an expedition or a copy of a judgement (between 0, 50 and 5 EUR per page, 
according to the instance). 
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Criminal cases 
As indicated above, an intervention in the honorarium and costs of the losing party is only 
possible in case of an acquittal, when the civil party has exercised the prosecution itself by 
direct summons before the criminal court (art. 162bis Criminal Procedure Code). In the 
vast majority of the cases the civil party will only intervene in a prosecution launched by 
the public prosecutor, so that the award of a “procedural allowance” will be very 
exceptional. The person who is convicted will be condemned to the costs of the procedure 
(art. 162 Criminal Procedure Code). The costs are regulated by the Royal Decree of 27 April 
2007. There are fixed tariffs for experts, translators and interpreters, bailiffs, witnesses, 
member of the jury and different technical interventions. 
 
Administrative cases 
As indicated earlier, the system of “judicial allowances” does not apply in the procedure 
before administrative tribunals or the Supreme Administrative Court, so the winning party 
must bear the costs and honorarium of its own lawyer. Before the Council of State a court 
fee has to be paid. The fee amounts to 175 EUR per requester. The same sum has to be 
paid separately if on demands also the suspension of the challenged act.  If e.g. 10 persons 
are introducing together a request for suspension or for annulment the fee will be each 
time 175 EUR. At the end of the procedure this court fee has to be paid by the losing party. 
The same principles apply before the Flemish Council for Permit Disputes (being that the 
court fee is 175 EUR for a demand for annulment and 100 EUR for a demand for 
suspension). 
  
Constitutional Court 
There is neither a court fee nor a system of “judicial allowances” before the Constitutional 
Court. 
 
Bonds 
 
The appellant in an environmental case has not to pay a bond in order to obtain an 
injunction of the appealed decision. However when an individual citizen or group of 
citizens act in the place of the defaulting municipality on the basis of Art. 271 Municipal 
Act (and its regional counterparts) there is an obligation to “offer” security that one should 
pay the costs of the proceedings and the condemnations if one loses. In general, a 
declaration that one shall bear the costs and that one has paid the initial court fee, is 
accepted as being sufficient in that regard. 
 
Evaluation 
 
The preparation of a case and the elaboration of the further pieces in the procedure and 
the pleadings are time consuming. With an hourly rate ranging from € 100 to € 300 
(without material costs) the barristers cost of a case will easily reach € 3000 to € 9000. 
Environmental NGOs mention an average cost of € 5000 for a Council of State case, and € 
2000 for a case before the ordinary courts. They try often to do themselves a maximum of 
preparatory work so that they can limit barrister’s costs. In some instances, barristers 
agree with a preferential tariff for an NGO (e.g. hourly tariff of € 75). A case for less than € 
2000 seems however impossible.  In complex cases, and in cases where there is a need to 
appeal, the cost can be much higher. Together with the court fees, which as such are not 
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so high, and the risk to have to pay in civil cases a “judicial allowance” as intervention in 
the lawyer’s fees and cost of the winning party, if one loses the case, this can be an 
obstacle for access to justice by ordinary people and ngo’s. If these costs are not covered 
by an insurance (that can be often the case when a private party is suffering damages that 
can be considered as environmental) one shall think often twice or more before launching 
procedures.  If it is not a clear cut case, one shall often abandon the idea to go to court.  
Although one cannot speak of “prohibitively expensive” procedures in Belgium, lawyer’s 
fees and the new system of “judicial allowances” have clearly a dissuasive effect. 
B. Examples: 
The aim of the following examples is to facilitate understanding of standing rules and conditions for 
access to justice in the various legal systems. The aim is to illustrate how different countries provide 
for access to justice in environmental matters and to prepare a discussion on the topic. Please 
highlight the specific aspects of your legal system without going to much into detail. If possible, 
please deal with all the examples. Please feel especially welcome to illustrate your answer by 
referring to examples of national case law. 
Example 1: The competent authority has adopted an action plan on air quality that will not 
adequately reduce the risk of exceeding EU air quality limits (contrary to relevant secondary EU 
law).  
Questions Example 1:  
B.1. What are the possibilities open for the public to legally challenge the plan and to ensure that an 
adequate plan is adopted and implemented? If any, who (individuals, NGOs, other) is entitled to 
challenge the plan? Is the appellant/plaintiff required to provide evidence on potential harm/damage 
and to specify the measures that should have been taken? 
The obligation to adopt an action plan on air quality when limit or target values  are 
exceeded  has been transposed in domestic law
37
. The only available avenue to bring such 
a case to court seems to be to start an ordinary procedure before a civil court (in urgent 
cases summary proceedings before the president of the court of first instance) asking for 
an injunction , coupled with a penalty payment.  If that failure could be considered as an 
“obvious violation” or “a serious threat for a violation” of environmental law in the sense 
of Art. 2 of the Act of 12 January 1993, that procedure would be available too. For NGO’s 
there is seems to be in the light of the recent case law of the Supreme Court no standing 
problem in the ordinary procedure anymore. There seems to be room for adjudication in 
conformity with Arts. 9 (3) and 9 (4) of the Aarhus Convention. 
Such a case was brought in the past by two individuals of a busy street against the city of 
Leuven and the Flemish Region, to oblige the city and the region to do PM measurements,  
to draw up an action plan to improve the air quality (within a period of 6 months) and to 
take the necessary measures to implement such a plan in the following 6 months and to 
condemn them to penalty payments of € 1000 per day of delay. The First judge (Justice of 
the Peace) declared himself without  jurisdiction, being of the opinion that such an order, 
would violate the separation of powers because not respecting the discretionary powers 
of the administrative authorities. On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Leuven rejected 
                                                          
37
 E.g. Flemish Region: Art. 2.5.2.4.1 VLAREM II. 
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this view an found the action admissible and within the courts’ jurisdiction. The Court 
however found that according to domestic law, monitoring was a duty of the Flemish 
Environment Agency, that the Flemish Government had already approved a reduction plan 
for the non-attainment areas, that this plan has offered to local authorities “a calculation 
of air pollution from road traffic-model” (CAR Model), that, although there might be on 
the basis of that model  question of exceeding limit values in the street concerned, the 
model is only a simulation with some approximation.  In the courts view it was not proven 
that the air quality limits were exceeded in reality, taking also into consideration that the 
CAR model was showing a gradual improvement of the situation under the influence of the 
regional plan, so that it was not proven that the authority was not complying with its 
obligations as set out in the Janecek case38. The claims were thus dismissed. 
Example 2: The competent authority has issued a permit for an infrastructural construction project 
(e.g., a motorway, a power line or a funicular). Part of the site concerned is situated in a Natura 
2000 area. In spite of a negative assessment of the implications for the Natura 2000 site, the 
competent authority agreed to the project for imperative reasons of overriding public interest (Art 
6.4. Habitats Directive).  
Questions Example 2: 
B.2.1. Who (individuals, NGOs, other) is entitled to challenge this decision by legal means? In what 
way do individuals need to be affected by the decision in order to have standing? With regard to 
standing rules for individuals and NGOs, does it make any difference whether the project in the 
example is subject to an EIA or not?  
In the first place, land use planning should make it possible to realise such a project. If the 
existing land use plans do prevent such a project, they should first be modified or a specific 
plan should be adopted.  If the plan or the amendment of an existing plan likely to have 
significant environmental effects, a SEA should be drafted. One’s the plan is adopted by 
the competent authority on the local or regional level, it can be challenged with the 
Council of State. The project itself will require a building permit (only in exceptional cases 
also an environmental permit is necessary for an “infrastructural construction project”), 
may be subject to EIA and need an appropriate assessment according (the regional 
legislation transposing) Art. 6 (4) of the Habitats Directive.  The permit, once delivered in 
first instance, can be appealed with the higher administrative authority.  A final decision 
on appeal, can be challenged before the Council of State and, as the Flemish region is 
concerned, the Flemish Council for Permit Disputes.  
The main elements of the decision-making procedure - that is varying between the 3 
regions - and how the decision can be appealed within the administration have been 
outlined in the Study on factual aspects of access to justice in relation to EU Environmental 
law. Belgium (2012) (pp. 5-6).  When a final decision by the authorities on administrative 
appeal has been taken, it can be challenged, within a period of 60 days before the Council 
of State, and, as the Flemish region is concerned, but only in relation to the building permit 
(the environmental permit has to be challenged with the Council of State) within a period 
of 45 days before the Flemish Council for Permit Disputes. According Art. 19 of the Organic 
Act on the Council of State, an action for annulment of an administrative act can be 
brought by any party (any natural or legal person) which has been "harmed" or has an 
                                                          
38
 Civil Court, Leuven, 10 March 2010, Van Eygen and Viane, (summary in Tijdschrift voor Omgevingsrecht en 
Omgevingsbeleid, 2012/1, 50-52). 
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"interest" at stake. Meeting this requirement does not pose particular problems for 
individual claimants. Proof of actual harm is not required; a legitimate interest in the 
contested act is sufficient. This interest need not necessarily be based on a legally 
recognised subjective right. Whether a natural person has the interest required to seek 
judicial review of an administrative decision affecting his or her environment is essentially 
a factual matter, which will be judged by the Council of State based on the specific 
circumstances of the case
39
. Although the notion "public concerned" within the meaning of 
the Aarhus Convention is not actually used, the case law on the criteria for standing for 
individual members of the public in substance comes very close to the definition of this 
notion in the Convention. The Council will examine whether the claimant will or may be 
affected by the environmental effects of the implementation of the decision. The nature 
and range of those effects will be taken into account. In the event of uncertainties, the 
decision on standing tends to be in favour of the claimant. The distance between the 
claimant's home and the activity that is the subject of the contested decision is an 
important consideration, but it is not necessarily decisive. In planning cases, e.g., the 
settled case-law is that any "inhabitant of the neighbourhood" has a legitimate interest to 
seek review of planning decisions affecting its aspect and development. There is also case-
law in which the Council held that a person using a forest area for recreational purposes 
(e.g. walking) can challenge the legality of an administrative act which will result in the 
deterioration of that area. It is for the moment unclear under which conditions an 
environmental NGO will have standing
40
. The solution can be different according to the 
Chamber (2 French and 2 Dutch speaking Chambers are involved) that has to deal with the 
case (see para 2.11).  There is however no doubt that a nature conservation NGO having 
property in the area or being in charge of the management a nature conservation area that 
could be affected, will have standing.  There is no variation in standing rules if the project 
is subject to EIA or not.  
 
B.2.2. Does an administrative appeal or an application for judicial review automatically have a 
“suspensive effect” on the decision at stake?  
In the administrative appeal procedures for e.g. environmental or building permits, in 
general only appeals lodged by authorities have suspensory effect, not appeals lodged by 
the applicant or third parties
41
. 
In case there is no automatic suspension in your national legal order: Under which conditions can the 
appellant obtain a suspension of the permit decision for the infrastructural project? Are there other 
measures of interim relief available to prevent negative harm to the environment until the final 
decision has been taken? In case of an automatic suspension: Can the developer of the 
infrastructural project ask for a “go-ahead-decision” in your national legal order?  
                                                          
39
 Similar provisions apply to the Flemish Council for Permit Disputes. A permit decision can be challenged by 
“any natural or legal person who  directly or indirectly  suffers from  disadvantages or  nuisances from  the 
authorization, validation or registration” (Art. 4.8.11.3° VCRO). 
40
 As the Flemish Council for Permit Disputes is concerned, there is a specific provision defining which type of 
NGO’s have standing: “’process competent’ (procesbekwame) associations acting on behalf of a group whose 
collective interests are threatened by the authorization, validation or registration decision or damaged, if they 
have a sustainable and effective activity in accordance with the Articles of Association” (Art.   4.8.11,4° VCRO) 
41
 However in the Flemish region, bulding permits appealed by third parties will be suspended (Art. 4.7.21 
VCRO) 
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By an Act of 1989 the Council of State was empowered to suspend the implementation of a 
challenged administrative decision or regulation (the Flemish Council for Permit Disputes 
has similar powers). An action for cessation (“vordering tot schorsing” “demande de 
suspension”) may be brought along with the action for annulment. The Council of State 
may suspend the challenged decision if the grounds for annulment are found to be valid 
on first sight (a serious plea is invoked “moyen serieux” “ernstige middelen”), if there is an 
urgent necessity and if the immediate implementation of the challenged act or regulation 
may cause detriment that is difficult to remedy. Even when the conditions for suspension 
are present, the Council is not obliged to suspend, taking into account the different 
interests at stake.  
 
According Article 584 of the Judicial Code, the President of the Court of First Instance is 
competent to give a provisional solution (interim relief) to any case in summary 
proceedings (“kort geding” “procedure en référé”). So the president can in urgent cases, 
after summary proceedings, order temporary measures with a view to avoid serious 
detriment
42
.  
Example 3: The competent authority has issued a permit and established permit conditions for an 
installation falling under the scope of the Industrial Emissions Directive – IED (e.g., a waste 
treatment facility or a tannery) The national permit procedure had been carried out in accordance 
with requirements on public participation (Art 24 IED).  
Questions Example 3:  
B.3.1. Are individuals in your country entitled to challenge the permit decision on the grounds that 
permit requirements of the IED have not been met: say, that the best available techniques have not 
been applied and energy is not used efficiently?  
Yes, if they have standing (see above).  
B.3.2. Is an NGO entitled to judicial review of the permit decision, even if it did not previously take up 
the opportunity to participate in the decision-making procedure? 
There is no obligation to participate in the decision-making process before the 
administrative decision has been taken. However, when there is and administrative appeal 
with a higher administrative authority  available (that is the case with environmental and 
building permits) one should exhaust first that possibility. Only administrative decisions 
taken in last administrative instance can be challenged before the administrative courts. 
Example 4: Citizens are concerned about a landfill that has been granted permission but is 
obviously operating in breach of permit conditions. Samples that have been taken by an NGO 
indicate that there is imminent danger of a drinking water source being contaminated. The 
competent authority is not taking any action. 
  
                                                          
42
 See for applications of this procedure in environmental matters: E. De Pue, L. Lavrysen & P. Stryckers, 
Milieuzakboekje 2013, Kluwer, Mechelen,  1245-1250 
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Question Example 4: 
Evaluate the possibilities of members of the public (individuals, NGOs) to ensure that (remedial) 
action is taken. 
Different avenues are available. In cases of potential environmental damages a request for 
action can be brought, and administratively appealed if one considers that the decision is 
not acceptable. In the Flemish region a similar request can be formulated to obtain 
administrative measures (including injunctions of all kind, Art. 16.4.7 Decree of 5 April 
1995). In all regions the Environmental Inspectorate can be informed and invited to take 
action. In the 3 regions the breach will probably be considered as an environmental crime. 
In that case one can fill in a complaint with the Public Prosecutor (and in case one suffers 
damages, with the Investigating Judge). That can lead to criminal prosecution (or an 
alternative administrative punishment if the public prosecutor decides not to prosecute 
before the criminal court). If one suffers damages, one can claim compensation in the 
criminal case.  Finally one can introduce an environmental action before the President of 
the Court of First Instance on the basis of the Act of 12 January 1993. Citizens, after having 
invited the municipality to act, can also bring such an action on behalf of the defaulting 
municipality.  
 
